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The
Nobel Peace Prize for 1997
The Nobel Lecture given by The Nobel Peace Prize Laureate 1997
- Jody Williams (Oslo, December 10, 1997)

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Copyright © The Nobel Foundation, Stockholm, 1997.

Your Majesties, Honorable Members of the Norwegian Nobel Committee,
Excellencies and Honored Guests:
It is a privilege to be here today, together with other representatives
of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, to receive jointly
the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize. Our appreciation goes to those who nominated
us and to the Nobel Committee for chosing this year to recognize,
from among so many other nominees who have worked diligently for
peace, the work of the International Campaign.
I am deeply honored -- but whatever personal recognition derives
from this award, I believe that this high tribute is the result
of the truly historic achievement of this humanitarian effort to
rid the world of one indiscriminate weapon. In the words of the
Nobel Committee, the International Campaign started a process
which in the space of a few years changed a ban on antipersonnel
mines from a vision to a feasible reality. Further, the Committee
noted that the Campaign has been able to express and mediate
a broad range of popular commitment in an unprecedented way. With
the governments of several small and medium-sized countries taking
the issue up...this work has grown into a convincing example of
an effective policy for peace.
The desire to ban land mines is not new. In the late 1970s, the
International Committee of the Red Cross, along with a handful of
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), pressed the world to look
at weapons that were particularly injurious and/or indiscriminate.
One of the weapons of special concern was landmines. People often
ask why the focus on this one weapon. How is the landmine different
from any other conventional weapon?
Landmines distinguish themselves because once they have been sown,
once the soldier walks away from the weapon, the landmine cannot
tell the difference between a soldier or a civilian -- a woman,
a child, a grandmother going out to collect firewood to make the
family meal. The crux of the problem is that while the use of the
weapon might be militarily justifiable during the day of the battle,
or even the two weeks of the battle, or maybe even the two months
of the battle, once peace is declared the landmine does not recognize
that peace. The landmine is eternally prepared to take victims.
In common parlance, it is the perfect soldier, the eternal
sentry. The war ends, the landmine goes on killing.
Since World War II most of the conflicts in the world have been
internal conflicts. The weapon of choice in those wars has all too
often been landmines -- to such a degree that what we find today
are tens of millions of landmines contaminating approximately 70
countries around the world. The overwhelming majority of those countries
are found in the developing world, primarily in those countries
that do not have the resources to clean up the mess, to care for
the tens of thousands of landmine victims. The end result is an
international community now faced with a global humanitarian crisis.
Let me take a moment to give a few examples of the degree of the
epidemic. Today Cambodia has somewhere between four and six million
landmines, which can be found in over 50 percent of its national
territory. Afghanistan is littered with perhaps nine million landmines.
The U.S. military has said that during the height of the Russian
invasion and ensuing war in that country, up to 30 million mines
were scattered throughout Afghanistan. In the few years of the fighting
in the former Yugoslavia, some six million landmines were sown throughout
various sections of the country -- Angola nine million, Mozambique
a million, Somalia a million -- I could go on, but it gets tedious.
Not only do we have to worry about the mines already in the ground,
we must be concerned about those that are stockpiled and ready for
use. Estimates range between one and two hundred million mines in
stockpiles around the world.
When the ICRC pressed in the '70s for the governments of the world
to consider increased restrictions or elimination of particularly
injurious or indiscriminate weapons, there was little support for
a ban of landmines. The end result of several years of negotiations
was the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). What that
treaty did was attempt to regulate the use of landmines. While the
Convention tried to tell commanders in the field when it was okay
to use the weapon and when it was not okay to use the weapon, it
also allowed them to make decisions about the applicability of the
law in the midst of battle. Unfortunately, in the heat of battle,
the laws of war do not exactly come to mind. When you are trying
to save your skin you use anything and everything at your disposal
to do so.
Throughout these years the Cold War raged on, and internal conflicts
that often were proxy wars of the Super Powers proliferated. Finally
with the collapse of the Soviet Bloc, people began to look at war
and peace differently. Without the overarching threat of nuclear
holocaust, people started to look at how wars had actually been
fought during the Cold War. What they found was that in the internal
conflicts fought during that time, the most insidious weapon of
all was the antipersonnel landmine -- and that it contaminated the
globe in epidemic proportion.
As relative peace broke out with the end of the Cold War, the U.N.
was able to go into these nations that had been torn by internal
strife, and what they found when they got there were millions and
millions of landmines which affected every aspect of peacekeeping,
which affected every aspect of post-conflict reconstruction of those
societies. You know, if you are in Phnom Penh in Cambodia, and you
are setting up the peacekeeping operations, it might seem relatively
easy. But when you want to send your troops out into the hinterlands
where four or six million landmines are, it becomes a problem, because
the main routes are mined. Part of the peace agreement was to bring
the hundreds of thousands of refugees back into the country so that
they could participate in the voting, in the new democracy being
forged in Cambodia. Part of the plan to bring them back included
giving each family enough land so that they could be self-sufficient,
so they wouldn't be a drain on the country, so that they could contribute
to reconstruction. What they found: So many landmines they couldn't
give land to the families. What did they get? Fifty dollars and
a year's supply of rice. That is the impact of landmines.
It was the NGOs, the non-governmental organizations, who began to
seriously think about trying to deal with the root of the problem
-- to eliminate the problem, it would be necessary to eliminate
the weapon. The work of NGOs across the board was affected by the
landmines in the developing world. Children's groups, development
organizations, refugee organizations, medical and humanitarian relief
groups -- all had to make huge adjustments in their programs to
try to deal with the landmine crises and its impact on the people
they were trying to help. It was also in this period that the first
NGO humanitarian demining organizations were born -- to try to return
contaminated land to rural communities.
It was a handful of NGOs, with their roots in humanitarian and human
rights work, which began to come together, in late 1991 and early
1992, in an organized effort to ban antipersonnel landmines. In
October of 1992, Handicap International, Human Rights Watch, medico
international, Mines Advisory Group, Physicians for Human Rights
and Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation came together to issue
a Joint Call to Ban Antipersonnel Landmines. These organizations,
which became the steering committee of the International Campaign
to Ban Landmines called for an end to the use, production, trade
and stockpiling of antipersonnel landmines. The call also pressed
governments to increase resources for humanitarian mine clearance
and for victim assistance.
From this inauspicious beginning, the International Campaign has
become an unprecedented coalition of 1,000 organizations working
together in 60 countries to achieve the common goal of a ban of
antipersonnel landmines. And as the Campaign grew, the steering
committee was expanded to represent the continuing growth and diversity
of those who had come together in this global movement. We added
the Afghan and Cambodian Campaigns and Rädda Barnen in 1996,
and the South African Campaign and Kenya Coalition early this year
as we continued to press toward our goal. And in six years we did
it. In September of this year, 89 countries came together -- here
in Oslo -- and finished the negotiations of a ban treaty based on
a draft drawn up by Austria only at the beginning of this year.
Just last week in Ottawa, Canada, 121 countries came together again
to sign that ban treaty. And as a clear indication of the political
will to bring this treaty into force as soon as possible, three
countries ratified the treaty upon signature -- Canada, Mauritius
and Ireland.
In its first years, the International Campaign developed primarily
in the North -- in the countries which had been significant producers
of antipersonnel landmines. The strategy was to press for national,
regional and international measures to ban landmines. Part of this
strategy was to get the governments of the world to review the CCW
and in the review process -- try to get them to ban the weapon through
that convention. We did not succeed. But over the two and one-half
years of the review process, with the pressure that we were able
to generate -- the heightened international attention to the issue
-- began to raise the stakes, so that different governments wanted
to be seen as leaders on what the world was increasingly recognizing
as a global humanitarian crisis.
The early lead had been taken in the United States, with the first
legislated moratorium on exports in 1992. And while the author of
that legislation, Senator Leahy, has continued to fight tirelessly
to ban the weapon in the U.S., increasingly other nations far surpassed
that early leadership. In March of 1995, Belgium became the first
country to ban the use, production, trade and stockpiling domestically.
Other countries followed suit: Austria, Norway, Sweden, and others.
So even as the CCW review was ending in failure, increasingly governments
were calling for a ban. What had once been called a utopian goal
of NGOs was gaining in strength and momentum.
While we still had that momentum, in the waning months of the CCW
review, we decided to try to get the individual governments which
had taken action or had called for a ban to come together in a self-identifying
bloc. There is, after all, strength in numbers. So during the final
days of the CCW we invited them to a meeting and they actually came.
A handful of governments agreed to sit down with us and talk about
where the movement to ban landmines would go next. Historically
NGOs and governments have too often seen each other as adversaries,
not colleagues, and we were shocked that they came. Seven or nine
came to the first meeting, 14 to the second, and 17 to the third.
By the time we had concluded the third meeting, with the conclusion
of the Review Conference on May 3rd of 1996, the Canadian government
had offered to host a governmental meeting in October of last year,
in which pro-ban governments would come together and strategize
about how to bring about a ban. The CCW review process had not produced
the results we sought, so what do we do next?
From the third to the fifth of October we met in Ottawa. It was
a very fascinating meeting. There were 50 governments there as full
participants and 24 observers. The International Campaign was also
participating in the Conference. The primary objectives of the conference
were to develop an Ottawa Declaration, which states would sign signalling
their intention to ban landmines, and an Agenda for Action,
which outlined concrete steps on the road to a ban. We were all
prepared for that, but few were prepared for the concluding comments
by Lloyd Axworthy, the Foreign Minister of Canada. Foreign Minister
Axworthy stood up and congratulated everybody for formulating the
Ottawa Declaration and the Agenda for Action, which were clearly
seen as giving teeth to the ban movement. But the Foreign Minister
did not end with congratulations. He ended with a challenge. The
Canadian government challenged the world to return to Canada in
a year to sign an international treaty banning antipersonnel landmines.
Members of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines erupted into
cheers. The silence of the governments in the room was defeaning.
Even the truly pro-ban states were horrified by the challenge. Canada
had stepped outside of diplomatic process and procedure and put
them between a rock and a hard place. They had said they were pro-ban.
They had come to Ottawa to develop a road map to create a ban treaty
and had signed a Declaration of intent. What could they do? They
had to respond. It was really breath-taking. We stood up and cheered
while the governments were moaning. But once they recovered from
that initial shock, the governments that really wanted to see a
ban treaty as soon as possible, rose to the challenge and negotiated
a ban treaty in record time.
What has become known as the Ottawa Process began with the Axworthy
Challenge. The treaty itself was based upon a ban treaty drafted
by Austria and developed in a series of meetings in Vienna, in Bonn,
in Brussels, which culminated in the three-week long treaty negotiating
conference held in Oslo in September. The treaty negotiations were
historic. They were historic for a number of reasons. For the first
time, smaller and middle-sized powers had come together, to work
in close cooperation with the nongovernmental organizations of the
International Campaign to Ban Landmines, to negotiate a treaty which
would remove from the world's arsenals a weapon in widespread use.
For the first time, smaller and middle-sized powers had not yielded
ground to intense pressure from a superpower to weaken the treaty
to accommodate the policies of that one country. Perhaps for the
first time, negotiations ended with a treaty stronger than the draft
on which the negotiations were based! The treaty had not been held
hostage to rule by consensus, which would have inevitably resulted
in a gutted treaty.
The Oslo negotiations gave the world a treaty banning antipersonnel
landmines which is remarkably free of loopholes and exceptions.
It is a treaty which bans the use, production, trade and stockpiling
of antipersonnel landmines. It is a treaty which requires states
to destroy their stockpiles within four years of its entering into
force. It is a treaty which requires mine clearance within ten years.
It calls upon states to increase assistance for mine clearance and
for victim assistance. It is not a perfect treaty -- the Campaign
has concerns about the provision allowing for antihandling devices
on antivehicle mines; we are concerned about mines kept for training
purposes; we would like to see the treaty directly apply to nonstate
actors and we would like stronger language regarding victim assistance.
But, given the close cooperation with governments which resulted
in the treaty itself, we are certain that these issues can be addressed
through the annual meetings and review conferences provided for
in the treaty.
As I have already noted, last week in Ottawa, 121 countries signed
the treaty. Three ratified it simultaneously -- signalling the political
will of the international community to bring this treaty into force
as soon as possible. It is remarkable. Landmines have been used
since the U.S. Civil War, since the Crimean War yet we are taking
them out of arsenals of the world. It is amazing. It is historic.
It proves that civil society and governments do not have to see
themselves as adversaries. It demonstrates that small and middle
powers can work together with civil society and address humanitarian
concerns with breathtaking speed. It shows that such a partnership
is a new kind of superpower in the post-Cold War world.
It is fair to say that the International Campaign to Ban Landmines
made a difference. And the real prize is the treaty. What we are
most proud of is the treaty. It would be foolish to say we that
we are not deeply honored by being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.
Of course, we are. But the receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize is recognition
of the accomplishment of this Campaign. It is recognition of the
fact that NGOs have worked in close cooperation with governments
for the first time on an arms control issue, with the United Nations,
with the International Committee of the Red Cross. Together, we
have set a precedent. Together, we have changed history. The closing
remarks of the French ambassador in Oslo to me were the best. She
said, This is historic not just because of the treaty. This
is historic because, for the first time, the leaders of states have
come together to answer the will of civil society.
For that, the International Campaign thanks them -- for together
we have given the world the possibility of one day living on a truly
mine-free planet.
Thank you.
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